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Abstract
Conventional trade theory, which combines the Heckscher-Ohlin theory and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, implies 
that expanded trade between developed and developing countries will increase wage equality in the former. Th   is theory is 
widely applied. It serves as the basis for estimating the impact of trade on wages using two-sector simulation models and 
the net factor content of trade. It leads naturally to the presumption that the rapid growth and declining relative prices of 
US manufactured imports from developing countries since the 1990s have been a powerful source of increased US wage 
inequality. 
In this study we present evidence that suggests the presumption is not warranted. We highlight the sensitivity of 
conventional theory to the assumption of incomplete specialization and ﬁ  nd evidence that is not consistent with it. Since 
1987, although US domestic relative eﬀ  ective prices in industries with relatively high shares of manufactured goods 
imports from developing countries have declined, eﬀ  ective unskilled worker–weighted prices have actually risen relative 
to skilled worker–weighted prices. If anything, this suggests pressures for increased wage equality. Also in apparent 
contradiction to theory, the (six-digit North American Industry Classiﬁ  cation System [NAICS]) US manufacturing 
industries with high shares of manufactured imports from developing countries are actually more skill intensive than the 
industries with high shares of imports from developed countries. Finally, applying a two-stage regression procedure, we 
ﬁ  nd that developing-country import price changes have not mandated increased US wage inequality. While these results 
conﬂ  ict with standard theory, they are easily explained if the United States and developing countries have specialized in 
products and tasks that are highly imperfect substitutes. If this is the case, the impact of increased trade with developing 
countries on US wage inequality is far more muted than standard theory suggests. Also methodologies such as the net 
factor content of trade using US production coeﬃ   cients and simulation models assuming perfect substitution between 
imports and domestic products could be highly misleading.
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US TRADE AND WAGES: THE MISLEADING IMPLICATIONS OF CONVENTIONAL 
TRADE THEORY
Conventional trade theory provides a powerful framework for thinking and testing the links between 
trade and wages. Th   e Heckscher-Ohlin theory predicts that patterns of trade reﬂ  ect relative factor 
endowments. In a two-good, two-factor model with skilled and unskilled labor, developing countries with 
relatively abundant endowments of unskilled labor will specialize in the production of unskilled labor–
intensive products. If these countries liberalize, therefore, they will increase their relative demand for 
skill-intensive products. To pay for these they will have to export additional quantities of unskilled labor–
intensive products. Together these forces will reduce the world relative price of unskilled labor–intensive 
products. Th   e domestic relative price of unskilled-intensive products will also decline if developed 
countries reduce their tariﬀ  s on imports from developing countries. 
Th   e theory developed by Stolper and Samuelson (SS) (1941) in turn provides the link between 
product prices and factor returns. It shows, in the case of two goods and two factors, that a decline in 
the relative price of a product reduces both the relative and absolute earnings of the factor used relatively 
intensively in its production.1 In combination, therefore, this Heckscher-Ohlin, Stolper-Samuelson 
framework (HOSS) implies that expanded trade with developing countries due to liberalization could be 
associated with increased wage inequality in their more developed counterparts.2
In this framework, the product prices of traded goods drive factor prices throughout the economy. 
In small, price-taking countries changes in relative factor supplies have no eﬀ  ect at all and in larger 
countries supply changes have an impact only to the extent they aﬀ  ect world prices of traded goods.3 
1. Factor intensity is deﬁ  ned by the factor shares in total costs. If there are two factors: skilled (s) and unskilled labor (u), 
and two goods: a skilled labor–intensive good x and an unskilled labor–intensive good y, there is a one-to-one relationship 
between the relative prices of the goods and the relative wages of skilled (Ws) and unskilled (Wu) workers. Using a * to 
indicate proportional rates of change, and Sx and Sy denote the shares of skilled labor in the production cost of x and y 
respectively then: Px* – P*y = (Sx – Sy) (Ws* – Wu*) Th   e theory can also explain the impact of productivity changes on 
factor prices, assuming given prices. In this case, an increase in productivity in an industry raises the relative return to the 
factor used relatively intensively.
2. More generally, because it predicts who wins and who loses from trade, the theory has been useful for explaining 
political positions and attitudes to trade. For an application of Stolper-Samuelson to international public opinion see 
Mayda and Rodrik 2002 and Alt and Gilligan 1999. 
3. In the case of countries too small to aﬀ  ect world prices, changes in domestic factor supplies simply shift the composition 
of output. If a country experiences an increase in the supply of unskilled labor, for example, these workers are absorbed 
into the labor force not by a change in wages but by an increase in the output of the unskilled labor–intensive industry and 3
Since Stolper-Samuelson assumes that skilled and unskilled labor are perfectly mobile, its predictions are 
extremely powerful because mobility implies that the forces aﬀ  ecting the wages of workers producing the 
goods that compete directly in international trade have similar eﬀ  ects on workers who produce nontraded 
goods and services in the rest of the economy. Richard Freeman (1995) memorably captured the power of 
this process in the title of his survey paper on the links between trade and wages when he asked “Are your 
wages set in Beijing?” 
Th   ere are, to be sure, other frameworks that feature trade in explaining wage behavior. Th  ey  include 
theories that assume that factors of production are sector speciﬁ  c and those that consider trade’s impact 
on worker bargaining power. But since these theories allow for workers with similar skill levels to earn 
diﬀ  erent wages depending on their industry of employment, they predict that the eﬀ  ects of trade occur 
mainly in the industries that produce particular traded goods and services and are less useful in explaining 
economywide wage trends.
Empirical Methods 
HOSS theory is also attractive because it can be applied quite easily. Th   is has made it the centerpiece of 
empirical studies on the impact of trade on income inequality. Th   ere are a number of diﬀ  erent empirical 
approaches that can be rigorously justiﬁ  ed.4 One is to estimate wage changes due to trade by calculating 
the net-factor content of trade. Th   is approach reﬂ  ects the insight that, in conventional framework, trade 
and factor movements are substitutes. Trade is equivalent to adding to the economy’s factor supplies 
the factors contained in imports, and subtracting from the supplies the factors contained in exports. 
Deardorﬀ   and Staiger (1988) provided a rigorous theoretical justiﬁ  cation for this application. Th  ey 
showed that using net-factor content approach to estimate wage eﬀ  ects implicitly involves comparing two 
equilibriums under conditions of self-suﬃ   ciency. 
Th   e second way to isolate the independent determinants of traded goods prices is to build small 
general equilibrium simulation models of relative wage determination (e.g., Krugman 1995 and Cline 
1997). Th   ese models can then be used to estimate the likely wage impact of exogenous shocks such as 
liberalization and/or growth in developing countries that will inﬂ  uence relative wages by aﬀ  ecting trade 
ﬂ  ows. Here the challenge is coming up with the correct parameters and calibration of the models. 
Econometric techniques less dependent on the HOSS theory can also be used. One of these 
pioneered by Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and applied by others (e.g., Haskel and Slaughter 2001, 2003) 
a reduction of output in the skill-intensive sector.
4. Th   e most straightforward versions identify the impact of trade with the prices of traded goods and explore directly 
whether these prices have moved in a way that would favor skilled or unskilled workers. But this is a considerable 
oversimpliﬁ  cation since global prices of traded goods are not independent causes but reﬂ  ect many inﬂ  uences such as 
changes in global factor endowments, trade policies, technologies, and preferences. Technically, international trade is an 
endogenous variable (Deardorﬀ   and Hakura 1994).4
involves econometric estimation in a two-step procedure. First, the eﬀ  ect of trade on product prices is 
estimated, and in a second step, estimates are made of the mandated wage changes that would result from 
the price changes due to trade predicted in the ﬁ  rst stage.
Th   is combination of powerful theoretical predictions and easy empirical applicability has made 
the HOSS alluring for work on the links between trade and wages. Th   e HOSS paradigm leads to 
the presumption that increased imports and declining relative prices of manufactured imports from 
developing countries will lead to substantial increases in US wage inequality. But we will argue that 
despite its virtues, the HOSS framework can be highly misleading because it ignores the role of complete 
specialization. 
In the ﬁ  rst section of this paper we emphasize the key role played by the assumption that domestic 
and imported goods are close substitutes. We note how its violation could lead to very diﬀ  erent outcomes. 
In the second section we describe several studies of recent US experience that do not support the view 
that the surge in US manufactured imports from developing countries has increased wage inequality in a 
major way. In the third section we explore the behavior of the relative prices of US manufactured goods 
and ﬁ  nd that domestic US price behavior has not been compatible with the HOSS paradigm. We show 
that while the US industries with high shares of developing-country imports have experienced declining 
relative prices, the presumption—based on the Heckscher-Ohlin theory that these US industries are 
intensive in unskilled labor is not borne out by the data. Indeed, we ﬁ  nd that eﬀ  ective US domestic prices 
have actually moved in a way that would justify greater wage equality!
It is possible that although import prices have exerted pressures on relative wages, there have been 
other sources of price changes that have oﬀ  set them. Absent trade, perhaps wage inequality might have 
fallen. In section four, therefore, we apply the two-step procedure of Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and 
isolate the pressures on wages speciﬁ  cally due to import prices from developing countries. We ﬁ  nd that 
these inﬂ  uences were negligible. Even without the eﬀ  ects of imports, therefore, we conclude that over the 
past decade, US relative wages would not have been very diﬀ  erent. 
All told, the presumption that declining relative prices of imports from developing countries 
provided pressures for increased US wage inequality is not warranted. We conclude that HOSS theory 
and the empirical methods that draw on it are inappropriate when it comes to anticipating and explaining 
the impact of US trade with developing countries on wage inequality because US domestic production 
has become highly specialized.
SECTION I: THE KEY ROLE OF INCOMPLETE SPECIALIZATION
Empirical applications of any theory will only yield the correct answer if the assumptions used in the 
theory are valid.5 While appealing in its simplicity, the assumptions required to apply the SS theory 
5. Th   e assumptions are so severe that the original Stolper and Samuelson paper was ﬁ  rst rejected for publication as a theory 5
using these methods are extremely restrictive.6 Th   e most important of these is nonspecialization: i.e., the 
assumption that the same goods that are imported are also produced at home. Domestic factor prices will 
depend only on the prices of goods that are actually produced domestically and if an imported product 
is not produced locally, its prices will not directly aﬀ  ect factor prices. Specialization could either occur 
because some homogeneous imported products are not produced domestically or because imports and 
domestic goods are imperfect substitutes.
Th   is is not simply a theoretical possibility. Schott (2003) has emphasized the empirical problems 
of applying the “single-cone” version of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory which requires that all countries 
produce all types of goods. He demonstrates how that framework fails to explain actual trade patterns. On 
the other hand, he does ﬁ  nd empirical support for a multicone equilibrium in which countries specialize 
in the subset of goods that are most suited to their endowments.
If a country is “fully specialized,” for example, and the goods produced at home all diﬀ  er from those 
that are imported the strong predictions of Stolper-Samuelson disappear. Relative factor supplies will 
aﬀ  ect factor prices and import prices will impact domestic product and factor prices only indirectly via 
their eﬀ  ects on demand for domestic goods.7 As Whalley and Abrego (2000) show, if rather than inﬁ  nite 
(i.e., perfect substitutes) the elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic products is unity—as 
many empirical studies suggest it might be—changes in import prices will not inﬂ  uence domestic product 
or factor prices at all!8
Again this is not simply a theoretical possibility. Many empirical trade models that are used to 
simulate trade policies adopt the so-called Armington assumption that products have distinctive national 
attributes and thus are imperfect substitutes. If countries are fully specialized as suggested by the imperfect 
substitutes model—aside from these demand channel eﬀ  ects—when import prices fall, all domestic 
producers could gain and if the price declines are concentrated in products that are disproportionately 
consumed by the poor, real (as opposed to relative) income diﬀ  erentials could actually narrow (Broda and 
Romalis 2008). 
Once it is acknowledged that changes in specialization patterns are taking place, it could require 
changes in the methods used to estimate the impact of trade. Adrian Wood (1994) argued that the 
by the editors of the American Economic Review who acknowledged that it was a “beautiful theoretical performance” but 
felt that “i[t] does not have anything to say about any real life situations with which the theory of international trade has 
to concern itself.” 
6. As noted by Henry Th   ompson (2007): “With more than the minimal number of inputs, there is no simple theoretical 
prediction regarding the wage.” It can be shown, however, that at least one factor will be made worse oﬀ   by trade. 
7. Relative factor supplies will matter for factor prices if an economy is fully specialized as in this example, or more 
generally when the number of factors is greater than the number of tradable goods that are produced at home. 
8. If the elasticity of substitution is less than unity, the sign of the eﬀ  ect actually changes: lower import prices of unskilled-
labor products would increase domestic prices of domestic substitutes! Th  e  eﬀ  ects would be present with the expected signs 
if the elasticity is greater than unity but would be far more muted than assumed in the case of perfect substitutes.6
early eﬀ  ects of trade on the wages of unskilled workers were larger than most of the existing studies had 
implied because while originally developed countries had produced unskilled labor–intensive products, 
specialization had evolved to the point that developed and developing countries produced diﬀ  erent kinds 
of products. Th   is meant that when studies used input-output coeﬃ   cients taken from developed countries 
to estimate the impact of trade they were seriously underestimating the degree to which imports from 
developing countries had previously displaced unskilled labor in developed countries.9 
But while Wood argued that the initial wage impact of replacing domestic production with imports 
from developing countries was underestimated, he also pointed out that once the adjustment had been 
made, the pressures for increased inequality would diminish. Th   us, his view (Wood 1995) also led him to 
reject the forecasts of those who argued that the impact of trade on the relative wages of unskilled workers 
in developed countries would become increasingly pronounced over time (e.g., Sachs and Shatz 1994 and 
Krugman 2007).10 Instead, he argued they would diminish because additional downward movements in 
the prices of most unskilled labor–intensive products would not put pressures on the wages of unskilled 
workers in developed countries once they no longer produced such goods.11 We will argue below that 
Wood was prescient.
Vertical Specialization 
Specialization could also be vertical. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) identify three channels 
through which imported intermediate inputs could aﬀ  ect domestic factor prices. Two are familiar. 
Th  e  ﬁ  rst is the relative price eﬀ  ect. If perfect substitutes for imported intermediate products are also 
produced at home, the conventional theory would still predict an impact on relative wages—though the 
eﬀ  ects would be transmitted within rather than between industries. Th   is operates like the conventional 
Stolper-Samuelson eﬀ  ect. Th   e second is what they call the labor-supply eﬀ  ect. Th   is occurs when there is 
displacement of activities when patterns of specialization change in economies in which relative supplies 
can also aﬀ  ect factor prices. If, for example, labor-intensive tasks were once undertaken at home and these 
move oﬀ  shore, the relative supply of labor could rise and wages could fall. Th  is  eﬀ  ect can be estimated 
using measures of the factors that were actually displaced.
Th   ey also uncover a third eﬀ  ect, the productivity eﬀ  ect that operates when cheaper imported inputs 
increase the proﬁ  tability of domestic assembly operation in which they are used. Cheaper imported auto 
9. For a critique of Wood, see Lawrence 1996. 
10. Wood (1995, pg. 77) wrote, “I do not expect unskilled workers in developed countries to be much hurt by even 
major new entry into the world market for low skill–intensive manufacturers, simply because these goods are no longer 
produced in developed countries. Th   e entry of China and India, pushing down the world prices of these goods, will beneﬁ  t 
developed-country workers, skilled and unskilled alike.” 
11. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) model a similar process in the context of an economy that has noncompeting imports.7
parts for example, could increase the proﬁ  tability of auto assembly. Th  is  eﬀ  ect operates exactly like sector-
biased productivity growth and will raise the return to the factor used relatively intensively in assembly.12 
Imports and domestic production are actually complements in this case rather than substitutes. 
Heterogeneous Firms
Recent theoretical literature on product specialization within industries as well as within ﬁ  rms provides 
additional insights. Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007) develop a multiﬁ  rm model that embodies 
heterogeneous ﬁ  rms in a model of comparative advantage. Trade liberalization induces a reallocation of 
resources both within and across industries and countries. Th   is leads to the emergence of more productive 
ﬁ  rms and exit of relatively ineﬃ   cient ﬁ  rms in all industries, but particularly in comparative advantage 
industries. Th   e productivity eﬀ  ect of this reallocation creates additional welfare gains from classical 
trade theory, but most importantly for our purposes, dampens the real and relative wage losses of scarce 
factors.13
More recently (2009, 2010), these authors have focused on multiproduct ﬁ  rm models where ﬁ  rms 
diﬀ  er with respect to the number of products they produce and export and their productivity levels. Trade 
liberalization causes the weakest ﬁ  rms to exit, and within surviving ﬁ  rms the least proﬁ  table products are 
dropped. Although their 2009 multiproduct model is not set up to look at wage inequality, the within-
ﬁ  rm increases in productivity in response to product switching is likely to enhance aggregate real wage 
gains from liberalization.
For our purposes, what is important is that relaxing the strict association between products that are perfect 
substitutes and the factor intensities that are associated with them makes the merging of the Heckscher-Ohlin 
and Stolper-Samuelson theories increasingly less tenable. If imports are not produced domestically, using 
domestic industry input coeﬃ   cients could be highly misleading. If specialization is complete and imports 
and domestic goods are imperfect substitutes, transmission from import prices to domestic factor prices 
is weaker than the theories assume and other considerations such as demand elasticities and relative factor 
supplies come into play. In addition with vertical specialization, the Stolper-Samuelson forces could 
still operate on domestic producers but they could also be oﬀ  set or even countermanded if domestic 
production and imports are complements rather than substitutes.14 Finally, adjustments by ﬁ  rms within 
industries in response to import competition can dampen the real and relative wage losses of scarce factors.
12. Th  is  eﬀ  ect has also been recognized by Feenstra and Hanson (1999) who note that oﬀ  shoring will show up in the 
industry aggregate production function as a change in total factor productivity.
13. Real wages of the scarce factor may even rise in response to the productivity improvements. Additional welfare gains 
arise from increases in the varieties of products produced.
14. Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006), for example, ﬁ  nd that some US ﬁ  rms have responded to import competition by 
investing more in equipment and technology. 8
SECTION II: STUDIES OF RECENT US EXPERIENCE
In the 1980s wage inequality was a major contributor to increased income inequality in the United States. 
Th   e earnings of workers with skills by all measures (education, occupation, experience) outpaced those 
with less skill by all of these criteria. Since this inequality occurred at the same time as an expansion 
in US trade with developing countries, it was quite natural that researchers considered whether trade 
could provide the explanation. Given the power of the theory and the tools available to apply it, it is no 
surprise that economists used their toolkits to estimate the impact of trade and wages in this framework. 
Th   e approaches did have some explanatory power, but the consensus seemed to be that while trade 
was a factor, other forces were more powerful. As noted by William Cline (1997) in his comprehensive 
survey, “a reasonable estimate based on the literature would be that international inﬂ  uences contributed 
about 20 percent [italics added] of the rising wage inequality in the 1980s.”15 Causes such as skill-
biased technological change, in combination with a slowdown in the growth rates of the supply of 
college graduates were given a greater role (Goldin and Katz 2007). In addition, other factors such as 
immigration, declining unions, and a change in norms were pointed to as contributing factors.
Th   rough the 1990s, however, US trade with developing countries expanded very rapidly and by 
2005 reached over 6 percent of US GDP. By then the value of nonoil US imports from developing 
countries had actually surpassed the value of imports from industrial countries. In addition, the prices 
of manufactured imports from developing countries declined dramatically relative to the prices of 
manufactured imports from developed countries. Th   ese developments raised the possibility that the eﬀ  ects 
of trade could have become much larger.
In 2007 in several newspaper columns, Paul Krugman (2007) drew attention to this development 
  “It’s no longer safe to assert that trade’s impact on the income distribution in wealthy countries 
is fairly minor. Th   ere’s a good case that it is big, and getting bigger…. It’s clear that applying 
the same models to current data that, for example, led William Cline of the Peterson Institute 
to conclude in 1997 that trade was responsible for a 6 percent widening in the college-high 
school gap would lead to a much larger estimate today.” 
If this conjecture is correct, the implications could be profound. Skilled and unskilled workers in 
the United States are generally distinguished in practice either by their occupations or their educational 
attainment (see box 1). Unskilled workers are typically those classiﬁ  ed as production workers or those 
with less than a college degree. Skilled workers are those in supervisory occupations or those with a college 
degree or more. By either these occupation or education measures almost 70 percent of US workers are 
15. In his own work based on simulations, Cline (1997, pg. 144) concludes that “a third [italics added] of net increase 
in the skilled-unskilled ratio from 1973–93 was attributable to trade and an additional one-ninth was attributable to 
immigration.” 9
considered to be unskilled. If the view expressed by Krugman is justiﬁ  ed, therefore, even if beneﬁ  cial in 
the aggregate, trade with developing countries could be reducing living standards for the vast majority of 
US workers! Moreover policies such as trade adjustment assistance that deal only with displaced workers 
would be seriously deﬁ  cient in compensating the losers. 
 Surprisingly, given these implications, relatively few studies have actually examined the more recent 
data. One possible reason for the paucity of recent studies is that since the early 1990s and especially after 
2000, as emphasized by Lawrence (2008), the evidence of increased wage inequality along the lines of 
skill is more mixed than it has been earlier.16 Moreover those studies that have been done have not proven 
there are large eﬀ  ects.
One reason is that there has also apparently been a rise in the estimated skill intensity of imports 
based on US input data. Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto (2007, table 3.30, pg. 175) report on a study 
that uses a net factor content approach to estimate job displacement.17 Th   is study estimates that job 
displacement due to trade between 2000 and 2004 was 1.9 million—about the same as the 1.8 million 
estimated as displaced between 1979 and 1989. But the composition of displacement was very diﬀ  erent. 
In particular, in the 1980s the job displacement was concentrated among less skilled workers: 12.2 
percent of those displaced were college graduates, and 28 percent had less than high school education. 
Displacement after 2000 was very diﬀ  erent: 21.3 percent of the displaced were college graduates—a 
proportion not very diﬀ  erent from their 25.6 percent share in the overall labor force.18 Given US 
nonfarm employment in 2000 of 130 million, this implies that the displacement due to trade reduced 
the employment ratio of high school to college graduates by three-tenths of a percent. If the elasticity 
of substitution between college and high school workers is unity, therefore, a decline of three-tenths of 
a percent in the relative wages of high school workers would be required to reemploy these displaced 
workers. Th   us the net factor approach suggests that more recent trade has not had a major impact on recent US 
wage inequality.
Krugman (2008), however, expresses skepticism at these estimates of modest eﬀ  ects. He argues 
16. Krugman (2008) and Lawrence (2008) have a diﬀ  erence of opinion on whether in fact wage inequality actually did 
increase in the United States, particularly after 2000. Unlike the 1980s, in which almost every possible classiﬁ  cation of 
wages by skill (occupation, education, experience, 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles) shows a rise in inequality, after 2000 
the picture is at best very mixed. While the relative wages of production workers had a strong declining trend through 
2000, in 2008 they were at levels that were similar to those in 1997. Similarly, the declines in the relative earnings of high 
school to college graduates between the late 1990s and 2007 were relatively small. For example in 2007 the ratio of full-
time earnings of male college graduates relative to male high school graduates was just 1.5 percent higher than in 1997. 
Th   ere is ample evidence of increased income inequality in the United States over the past decade, but as discussed in 
Lawrence (2008) this was associated with high proﬁ  t shares and earnings of the super rich, rather than changes in relative 
wages. 
17. Th   eir work is based on Scott, Lee, and Schmitt 1997. 
18. Lawrence (2008, pg. 40) similarly ﬁ  nds US industries with high import shares from developing countries also do not 
typically pay wages that are lower than those in the economy as a whole.10
that the factor content coeﬃ   cients are subject to aggregation bias and could miss the important eﬀ  ects if 
developing countries specialize in unskilled labor–intensive intermediate product niches.19 Aggregation 
bias is, however, not an issue for the methodology, which uses simulation models using calibrated rather 
than estimated parameters. Bivens (2007) updated the simulation model developed by Krugman (1995) 
himself. Th   ese simulation models involve simply assuming that all imports from developing countries 
are unskilled labor–intensive and using plausible coeﬃ   cients for skill intensity. Th   is application suggests 
that increased US trade with developing countries between 1995 and 2006 boosted the US wage skill 
premium by just 2.1 percent (log points.) Lawrence Katz (2008), commenting on Krugman (2008), 
points out that the Bivens estimate implies that about 15 to 19 percent of the increase in the 26 percent 
long point increase in the college wage premium from 1980 to 2006 can be ascribed to trade. Apparently 
adding in data from the recent experience using this methodology does not materially aﬀ  ect the results 
obtained in the earlier studies. 
Bivens’s estimate is important since it presents an upper bound because it probably overstates the 
eﬀ  ects of developing-country trade on US unskilled wages for ﬁ  ve reasons. First, it assumes that that all of 
the goods imported from developing countries are perfect substitutes for domestic products. As we noted in 
the previous section, if imports and domestic goods are diﬀ  erent products, the eﬀ  ects only operate on factor 
prices via the demand side and could be much smaller than he implicitly assumes by using the model. 
Second, it ignores the intermediate inputs of skilled labor–intensive products contained in 
imports from developing countries. For example goods whose ﬁ  nal assembly is in China may contain 
skill-intensive, value-added content from countries like the United States or Japan. Th   is leads to an 
overstatement of the unskilled-labor content of these imports.
Th   ird, it ignores the possibility that US ﬁ  rms might have adopted more skill-intensive technologies 
in their eﬀ  orts to compete with developing-country products (factor intensity reversals).20 If US goods 
that compete with developing-country imports are actually skill intensive, declining import prices from 
developing countries would actually reduce, rather than increase, wage inequality.
Fourth, it ignores the possibility of the Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) productivity eﬀ  ect by 
which lower input prices of labor-intensive tasks outsourced from labor-intensive industries could raise 
the relative wages of unskilled workers.
19. Feenstra and Hanson (2000) explored the issue of aggregation bias using net-factor content to estimate the impact of 
trade on wages. Th  ey  ﬁ  nd that while trade increased the (relative supply) ratio of production to nonproduction workers by 
5 percent, this proportion did not change much between 1982 and 1994. Th   ey conclude “It seems unlikely that the factor 
content of trade has been a driving force behind changes in wages” 
20. It should be noted, however, that the results are sensitive to the parameter that is assumed for the elasticity of 
substitution between skilled and unskilled labor. In Krugman’s (1995) model this is set at one. As Cline (1997, pgs. 
161–163) notes there is a large range of estimates in the literature, and parameters less than one would indicate larger wage 
eﬀ  ects. 11
Finally, there is reason to believe the assumed parameters overstate the skill diﬀ  erences in industries 
that are actually involved in US trade. Bivens follows Krugman (1995) and assumes that in the US 
export industry skilled workers are half the workforce and earn two-thirds of the wage income, whereas 
in the US import-competing industry skilled workers constitute only 20 percent of the workforce and 
earn a third of the income.21 In fact, as we will show below, these assumed diﬀ  erences are far larger than 
suggested by weighting US six-digit industry skill ratios by their actual shares in imports from developed 
and developing countries.
Econometric work provides corroborating evidence for the low impact of trade on US wage 
inequality. Nino Sitchinava (2008) has reﬁ  ned and updated the methodology used by Feenstra and 
Hanson (1999) to measure outsourcing more accurately. She ﬁ  nds a role for both outsourcing and the 
adoption of computers on the skill-unskilled wage gap between 1989 and 1996. However, she concludes 
that “neither of these factors aﬀ  ects wages between 1997 and 2004.” In sum, all three of these approaches 
imply that if there are eﬀ  ects on wages from developing-country trade recently, they are relatively modest. 
SECTION III RECENT US EXPERIENCE: MISSING LINKS IN THE HOSS PARADIGM
In this section we explore whether declining relative prices of imports from developing countries have 
been associated with declining relative eﬀ  ective prices of unskilled labor–intensive products. According to 
the HOSS, wage inequality increases in response to declining prices of imports from developing countries, 
which occurs because of three presumptions: (1) declining import prices put downward pressure on the 
relative domestic prices in US industries that produce close substitutes; (2) these downward movements 
in relative domestic prices are not oﬀ  set by productivity changes and thus eﬀ  ective relative prices, which 
reﬂ  ect both prices and productivity, also fall; and (3) these declining relative eﬀ  ective prices occur in 
industries that are relatively intensive in unskilled labor and therefore mandate lower relative wages for 
less skilled Americans.
We will show that since the early 1990s, the ﬁ  rst two parts of this story seem to hold. Th  e  domestic 
relative prices in industries with relatively high shares of manufactured goods imports from developing 
countries have declined. In addition, while some of the decline is attributable to relatively faster 
productivity growth, the declines remain even when productivity growth is taken into account. 
Th   e problems for the HOSS story arise, however, because these eﬀ  ective price movements have not 
translated into declines in the relative eﬀ  ective prices of unskilled labor–intensive goods. Indeed, eﬀ  ective 
production worker–weighted prices have actually risen relative to nonproduction worker–weighted prices. 
21. Th   ese do seem be reasonable assumptions to capture skill diﬀ  erences across US industries but they do not necessarily 
capture those involved in trade. In 2007, in industries in the most skill-intensive third of manufacturing employment, 46 
percent of the workforce was nonproduction workers; in the third with the least skill-intensive industries, only 19 percent 
were nonproduction workers. 12
Rather than mandating increased wage inequality, therefore, recent domestic price trends appear to 
require movements toward more equal wages. 
Th   e link is broken because Heckscher-Ohlin theory is a poor guide to the factor intensity of the US 
industries that are classiﬁ  ed in the same categories as those with a high share of imports from developing 
countries. In apparent contradiction to the theory, the (six-digit NAICS) US manufacturing industries 
with high shares of manufactured imports from developing countries are actually more skill intensive than 
the industries with high shares of imports from developed countries! 
One three-digit US industry (NAICS 334)—computers and electronics—plays a role in these 
unexpected results. NAICS 334 is an anomaly. It employs very high shares of skilled workers22 and 
has had extraordinary productivity growth and rapidly declining prices. Surprisingly, given these 
characteristics, developing countries dominate US imports of these products—their share was 74 percent 
in 2000.23 Moreover, these imports were relatively more important for developing countries. In 2000, for 
example, NAICS 334 products accounted for 34 and 16 percent of the value of manufactured imports 
from developing and developed countries respectively. 
Th   e movements in prices and productivity have been so large that when NAICS 334 is included in 
price and/or productivity measures it has a dominant eﬀ  ect. Th   e larger weight given to the 334 industry 
when it comes to developing countries is an important reason that relative import prices from developing 
countries have fallen rapidly. It also helps explain why judged by US input coeﬃ   cients manufactured 
imports from developing countries are relatively more skilled-labor intensive.
Dropping the computer sector from the data yields results that are somewhat more closely in line 
in with conventional expectations. But the Heckscher-Ohlin link is still absent: Even excluding NAICS 
334, imports from developing countries are as skill intensive as imports from developed countries. 
Excluding NAICS 334, there have been some small declines in the relative US domestic prices of goods in 
which imports from developing countries have higher shares. And prior to 2000, these declines were not 
fully oﬀ  set by relatively faster multifactor productivity growth. However, downward price pressures on the 
wages of unskilled workers are still not evident. Excluding the computer sector, the price and multifactor 
productivity behavior of unskilled labor–intensive products is no diﬀ  erent from that of skilled labor–
intensive products. Even without computers and electronics, therefore, relative wage changes do not 
appear warranted.
22. Th   e industries composing the sector are the most skill-intensive in manufacturing. Th   ere are sixteen 6six-digit 
industries in the 334 sector and eight 8 of these are in the top ten10. In 2002 these eight had production worker shares in 
employment ranging from 0.31 to 0.42. Overall the average ratio for the entire 334 industry of 0.50 is equal to the 24th 
highest ranking, six-digit industry.
23. In 2000, imports from developing countries accounted for 86 percent of total imports in computers, communications, 
and audio and video equipment respectively and 74 percent of imports in NAICS 334 overall.13
PRICES
Import prices appear to conﬁ  rm the HOSS story. As shown in ﬁ  gure 1 between 1990 and 2008, the 
prices of manufactured imports from developing countries fell dramatically relative to prices of imports 
from developed countries.24 However, what matters for US wages are domestic prices and accordingly we 
consider the behavior of domestic value-added prices and multifactor productivity.
We have data from 1987 to 2006 for all 88 of the four-digit NAICS industries that compose the 
US manufacturing sector. While these data are more aggregated than we would like, they have three 
virtues: (1) Th   ey provide comprehensive coverage of the manufacturing sector; (2) they are measures of 
value added rather than ﬁ  nal output and by excluding input costs capture precisely the variable that is 
directly related to industry wages and proﬁ  ts; and (3) they can be matched with estimates of multifactor 
productivity growth that have been calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and skills as 
indicated by employment shares of production and nonproduction workers.
Import-Share Weighted Prices
Using manufacturing imports trade data at the four-digit NAICS level for all industries except reﬁ  ned 
petroleum we aggregate the value-added price deﬂ  ators, weighting them by the average share of each 
industry in US manufactured imports from developing and industrial countries between 1997 and 
2006.25 Th   e relative domestic prices in industries with high shares of developing-country imports appear 
to mirror those of import prices. As reported in table 1, between 1987 and 2006, the developing-country 
manufactured import-weighted price series declines by 45 log points relative to the developed country 
import weighted series. While not strictly comparable to the manufacturing import price series because 
of weighting diﬀ  erences, the decline in this relative domestic price measure between 1990 and 2006 of 41 
log points is even greater than the 25.3 log point drop in the ratio of manufactured import prices from 
developing countries to those of manufactured import prices from industrial countries shown in ﬁ  gure 1.
Factor prices such as real product wages will reﬂ  ect not only product prices but also productivity. In 
addition to product prices, therefore, productivity changes should be accounted for. Accordingly we use 
the matched BLS data on multifactor productivity growth to estimate changes in “eﬀ  ective prices” i.e., 
price changes plus productivity changes. As reported in table 1 (row 3) we therefore subtract the inverse 
of the log of relative productivity growth from the relative price changes to estimate changes in eﬀ  ective 
prices. Productivity growth was especially high in sectors with declining prices and as a result eﬀ  ective 
prices suggest wage pressures that are far more muted than if the relative prices were assumed to be the 
24. Th   ere were similar declines in import prices from developing countries relative to US nonagricultural export prices 
(Edwards and Lawrence 2010, chapter 2).
25. NAICS trade classiﬁ  cations have only been used since 1997.14
only determinant of wages. Th   e relative developing to industrial country import-weighted measure of 
eﬀ  ective domestic prices still has a downward trend but the decline between 1987 and 2006 is just 6 log 
points (compared with 45 log points for prices alone, see table 1). 
Skill-Share Weighted Prices
But do these price changes translate into declining prices of relatively unskilled labor–intensive products? 
To answer this question we weight the value added and productivity measures by employment shares of 
production and nonproduction workers—our proxy for skill intensity.26 We use census data and average 
industry employment shares for 1997, 2002, and 2007. 
Weighting by skill produces surprising results. Between 1987 and 2006, this price measure 
actually increases by 13 log points more when weighted by production worker shares than it does when 
weighted by nonproduction worker shares (table 1). In contrast to the impression left by the import-
weighted price shares, therefore, this result appears to imply pressures for greater wage equality! Again 
these pressures are more muted when productivity changes are accounted for. Weighted by employment 
shares, relative eﬀ  ective prices of production to nonproduction workers rise by just 2 percent over the 
entire period (compared with the 13 percent increase in the price deﬂ  ators). In this case there appear to 
be smaller pressures for increased wage equality—although the Stolper-Samuelson theory does indicate 
a “magniﬁ  cation eﬀ  ect” depending on relative factor shares that could be quite large if these shares are 
relatively close.27 Th   e contrasting trends in the import and skill weighted series is vividly captured in 
ﬁ  gure 2.
Th  e  diﬀ  erences in the eﬀ  ective relative price trends when imports and employment shares are 
used as weights highlight the key problem with the presumption that US industries with high shares of 
imports from developing countries are relatively intensive in unskilled labor. As indicated in table 2, this 
key presumption in the HOSS story is not borne in the data. In fact, US industries with high shares of 
imports from developing countries are relatively skill intensive! When weighted by developing-country import 
weights, (we use average shares between 1997 and 2007) the share of production workers in the average 
industry wage bill of 55 percent is actually lower than when weighted by developed-country import 
weights (60 percent). Both are considerably lower than the share of production workers in the overall 
wage bill for manufacturing (71 percent). Th   is indicates that products that are traded tend generally to be 
more skill intensive.
26. Skill intensity can be measured either by numbers of workers, the ratio of production to nonproduction (prod/nprod), 
or by the shares paid to each type of worker in value added (sprod/snprod). For the purposes of linking product and factor 
prices in the Stolper-Samuelson theory the cost shares measures are more appropriate and those are used in these data.
27. Using a * to indicate proportional rates of change, and Sx and Sy are the shares of skilled labor in the production cost 
of x and y respectively the theory indicates that Px* – P*y = (Sx – Sy) (Ws* – Wu*). Th   is implies larger changes in wages for 
any given relative price changes when Sx – Sy is small, so long as both products continue to be produced.15
MEASUREMENT ERROR
Before we reject the HOSS, however we need to consider two possible sources of measurement error that 
could aﬀ  ect this result. First, when the BLS measures some prices and particularly those of computers 
and electronics products it makes distinctive “hedonic” adjustments for quality improvement. If these 
are mismeasured, the rapidly declining prices (and rapidly rising productivity growth) recorded for these 
products could be inaccurate and contaminate the results. And second, there could be aggregation bias 
from using data at the four-digit level. Th   ese data could submerge more reﬁ  ned industrial categories, 
which are unskilled labor intensive within larger categories in which skilled labor dominates. In what 
follows, therefore, we explore these issues, ﬁ  rst by excluding the computer sector from the results, and 
second by providing estimates of price behavior and skill intensity using available six-digit NAICS data. 
Computers and Electronics 
We can isolate the role of computers and electronics products in the domestic price and productivity 
outcomes. Th   e price declines have been quite astonishing. In 1987, for example, prices of computers 
NAICS 3341 and semiconductors NAICS 3344 were 2,446 and 650 percent higher than in 2006 
Box 1     Defi  ning skilled and unskilled labor
In this study we use the classifi  cation of US workers into production and nonproduction workers as our measure of 
skills because it allows us to use more disaggregated industry data. The US input-output tables used in the study 
match trade and employment for manufacturing at the four-digit NAICS, which divides manufacturing into 88 dif-
ferent industries. This is the most disaggregated level for which data on worker educational levels is available. More 
disaggregated census data are also available for manufacturing at the six-digit level, which reports on 470 diff  erent 
industries. This is a high level of disaggregation. 1
We can exploit this data by using census employment measures of production and nonproduction workers as 
our proxy for “skilled” and “unskilled” workers. This measure is not ideal because it includes some relatively poorly 
paid white collar offi   ce workers—educational attainment measures might be preferred—but it does have the vir-
tue of being available at both the four- and six-digit NAICS level. 2 Moreover distinguishing between production 
and nonproduction workers segments the manufacturing labor force into groups with shares and wages that are 
not very diff  erent from a classifi  cation system based on education. For example, in 2005 production worker wages 
were 65 percent of the wages of manufacturing nonproduction workers. In the same year, the weekly wages of full-
time male and female workers with a high school degree were 60 and 62 percent of male and female workers with 
college degrees. Similarly, the percent of manufacturing employment with a college degree is quite similar to the 
percent of employment of nonproduction workers. 
1. On average in the years 1997, 2002, and 2007 the typical six-digit industry had 31,700 employees.
2. In 2007 production workers accounted for 71 percent of manufacturing employment. On average, production worker wages 
at $37,512 were 57.6 percent of the $65,083 earned by nonproduction workers. 16
and prices for communications (3342), audio (3343), and optical equipment (3346) also have strong 
downward trends. At the same time multifactor productivity growth has been very rapid. Productivity in 
2006 was 20.5 and 12.5 times higher in computers and semiconductors, respectively, than it was in 2006. 
Dropping the measures of the six four-digit 334 sectors from our sample produces some interesting 
changes and reveals again the large role that these observations play in the results. Th  e  eﬀ  ects can be seen 
in table 3. Excluding these variables leaves us with very small eﬀ  ects. Instead of a 45 log point decline 
between 1987 and 2006, the decline in the relative import-weighted domestic price series is now only 4 
log points for the period as a whole—all of which is completed by 1995. Th   e decline in eﬀ  ective prices 
is just 3 percent and again the measure is unchanged between 1995 and 2006. Similarly, instead of a 13 
percent rise in relative production worker–weighted prices, these prices fall, but by just 1 percent over the 
entire period. Eﬀ  ective relative skill-weighted prices remain almost constant throughout the period. Indeed 
what is so striking about these results particularly for the period after 1995, for which the weights are more 
relevant, is how small the changes in both relative prices and relative eﬀ  ective prices are. All told, therefore, if 
the computer sectors are excluded from the data, the overall price changes do not mandate changes in the 
relative wages of skilled workers.
Dropping the computer sector lowers the estimated skill content of imports from both developed 
and developing countries and brings them closer together, but as reported in table 2, industries with high 
shares of imports from developing countries remain slightly more skill intensive than those with high 
developed-country import shares. Even without NAICS 334, therefore at the four-digit level, there is no 
support for the Heckscher-Ohlin presumption that imports from developing countries occur in industries 
that are more intensive in unskilled labor.
Should the computer industry be included in data? In an earlier debate, Jeﬀ  rey Sachs and 
Howard Shatz (1994) were critical of Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) for including it. Th  ey  argued 
that measurement error was so rife in the prices of these products—they are measured using hedonic 
price regressions—and their behavior such an outlier that they should not be included.28 If we follow 
this advice and exclude computers and electronics, there is little to suggest that recent domestic price 
movements have mandated lower wages for unskilled workers.
On the other hand, by excluding computers and electronics we could be overlooking an important 
source of wage pressures. Th   e sector does, after all, account for a third of all manufactured imports from 
developing countries and a high share of US manufacturing productivity growth. Including the data for 
computers and electronics indicates that the relative prices of skill-intensive industries have fallen—which 
ceteris paribus would be good for unskilled wages—but that these price pressures have been oﬀ  set by 
28. It is certainly well recognized that because prices are changing so rapidly, ﬁ  xed weight indexes give results that are very 
sensitive to the base year that is used. For this reason, chain-weighted indexes are now used in the US national income 
accounts.17
rapid productivity growth. Both with and without computers, therefore, the implication—consistent with 
actual wage behavior—is that in recent years, trade is not a major source of increasing US wage inequality.
Aggregation
Paul Krugman (2008) noted the strange coincidence of high skill intensity and large developing-country 
shares in imports in the computer and electronics industry and cited it as an example of the aggregation 
bias that confounds those who believe that developing-country trade has caused substantial wage 
inequality. Th   e problem is that some parts of some industries might be relatively less skill intensive but 
submerged in the aggregate data of more skill-intensive sectors.
Is this concern warranted? Th   ere are data available at the six-digit NAICS for producer prices and 
production and nonproduction worker employment. Th   is is a high level of disaggregation with average 
employment in each six-digit industry of about 30,000 workers. But the data are not ideal. First because 
producer prices include the cost of inputs not produced in each industry and second because price 
measures should be adjusted for productivity growth. 
Currently, 456 Producer Price indexes are available at the six-digit NAICS level. Unfortunately, 
however, some of these have only been introduced recently (after 2003). We were, however, able to obtain 
continuous measures for about 280 price indices—excluding reﬁ  ned petroleum—that are available back 
to 1994. Th   ese accounted for about 70 percent of all US manufactured imports in 2000. We weight 
these prices by the average shares of developing- and developed-country imports and production and 
nonproduction worker shares between 1997 and 2006. 
As shown in ﬁ  gure 3, we obtain results that are qualitatively similar but more extreme than those at 
the four-digit level suggesting that aggregation does dampen some of the diﬀ  erences. When the computer 
and electronics industries are included in the data, the downward trend in the relative developing-
country import-weighted producer prices is even stronger than the decline in similarly trade-weighted 
four-digit deﬂ  ators. Between 1994 and 2006, the years for which we have overlapping data, the relative 
import-weighted producer prices decline by 44 log points compared to the 32 log point percent decline 
in the correspondingly weighted four-digit price deﬂ  ator measure. Prices weighted by production worker 
employment shares increase by 15 log points relative to prices weighted by nonproduction worker shares. 
Th   is is also more than twice the 11 log point increase over the same period with similarly weighted four-
digit deﬂ  ators. 
While larger price pressures are uncovered by disaggregation, therefore, again the price pressures from 
developing-country imports do not translate into price pressures in sectors with high shares of production 
workers. Further disaggregation of the data therefore does not provide evidence for the substantial wage 
impacts expected by Krugman (2008).
Computer prices inﬂ  uence this result, too. Excluding the 29 6-digit 334 industries, the relative 18
developing/developed import weighted declines are 9 log points rather than 44 log points. Th  is  compares 
with the drop of just 1 percent for the similarly weighted four-digit deﬂ  ators when computers are 
excluded. After dropping the 334 industries, the relative production worker prices no longer rise but 
instead now do decline over the period (i.e., by 3 log points between 1994 and 2008). Th  us,  when 
computers and electronics are excluded, the downward import-weighted producer price pressures do 
translate into some increased inequality along the lines of skills but it is just three log points over the 14-
year period. 
Further disaggregation also does not resolve the apparent paradox of the similarity in the skill 
composition of US imports from developing and developed countries. Weighted average payroll 
calculated using developing- and developed-country import shares at the six-digit levels yield very 
similar shares to those in table 2. In both cases, the developing-country import-weighted payroll share of 
production workers is actually lower than the developed-country import-weighted share. It is 54.6 versus 
60.3 percent in the case of the four-digit measure and 51.2 versus 54.8 percent for the six-digit measure.29 
Computers and electronics products do make a diﬀ  erence in these unexpected results although, 
unlike the price data, we have no reason to exclude the wage and employment data from these industries 
on the grounds of measurement error. Without the computer and electronics industries, it does appear 
that imports from developing countries are relatively intensive in unskilled labor. Th   e production worker 
payroll share, when weighted by developing-country imports of 59.7 percent, is higher than the 56.4 
percent share using developed-country import weights. 
In sum, abstracting from the computer sector there is justiﬁ  cation using disaggregated data for the 
presumption that manufactured goods imported from developing countries are less skill intensive than 
those imported from developed countries. But the diﬀ  erences are remarkably small and certainly not in 
line with conventional Heckscher-Ohlin theory. Remarkably, therefore, even at the six-digit level the 
supposition that US imports from developing countries are disproportionately concentrated in industries 
in which unskilled workers account for a relatively high share of wage bill is not evident in the data.
Th  is  ﬁ  nding has important methodological implications. It suggests that even at the most 
disaggregated level feasible, net factor content of trade analysis using recent data will not indicate that 
trade induced large changes in relative wages. Indeed since we have considered only the direct factor 
inputs, input-output analysis, which takes account of inputs from other industries, is likely to show even 
smaller diﬀ  erences in factor intensity.
29. An alternate measure of factor intensity is to use employment shares rather than payroll shares. We have weighted the 
skills intensity measure (share of production workers in employment) of 373 6-digit NAICS industries that we can match 
with trade data for imports from developing and industrial countries. Th   ese indicate that for the period 1994 to 2008 it 
makes no diﬀ  erence to average skills intensity whether imports from developing or developed countries are used as weights. 
In both cases the weighted average production worker employment share was 64.4 percent, signiﬁ  cantly lower than the 71 
percent share in US manufacturing as a whole. 19
Th   ere are several ways of understanding these results but none are consistent with the HOSS 
story. One possibility, which is at odds with Heckscher-Ohlin theory, is that imports from developing 
countries are actually skill intensive. A second is that production processes are diﬀ  erent, i.e., there are 
factor intensity reversals and goods produced using unskilled labor relatively intensively in developing 
countries are produced in the US using skilled labor–intensive methods. But this would imply that 
declining relative import prices from developing countries are actually a force for increased wage equality! 
Th   e third possibility is that even at highly disaggregated classiﬁ  cations, the goods imported from 
developing countries are quite diﬀ  erent from those made in the USA. Th   is possibility would imply that 
once the economy becomes specialized, import prices have quite muted impacts on relative wages in US 
manufacturing.
SECTION IV: ISOLATING THE IMPACT OF TRADE PRICES WITH MANDATED 
WAGE REGRESSIONS
Prices and productivity in a large country such as the United States are outcomes of a range of domestic 
(R&D, tastes, imperfect competition) as well as international forces (tariﬀ  s, foreign prices, commodity 
cycles, international transport costs). It is, therefore, possible that price pressures from developing countries 
have been a force for wage inequality, but these pressures have been oﬀ  set by changes in other variables that 
inﬂ  uence US value-added prices and productivity. Th   ere is always the possibility that “but for trade” US 
wage inequality might have fallen. 
In this section, we deal with this concern and isolate the contribution of developing-country trade 
to changes in wages using US import unit values and tariﬀ  s. Th   e analysis follows Feenstra and Hanson 
(1999) and is conducted in two steps. Th  e  ﬁ  rst stage isolates the impact of imports on US eﬀ  ective prices 
(value added plus productivity) using four-digit NAICS level data. Th   is is done by regressing eﬀ  ective 
prices on import unit values and tariﬀ   rates associated with US imports from developed and developing 
countries. Other structural determinants such as investment in information capital stock, capital intensity, 
and skill intensity are also included in the speciﬁ  cation.30
Th   e second stage uses these estimated price changes to determine the relative wage changes 
mandated by these import price changes. Th   is is done by regressing the predicted change in eﬀ  ective 
30. Th   e equation we estimate is speciﬁ  ed as:  jt k jt k jt jt Z TFP P         , log log  where P denotes value-
added price, TFP denotes total factor productivity, jt is the random error, and the estimated coeﬃ   cients k capture the 
contribution of the structural variables Zk to changes in eﬀ  ective prices. In eﬀ  ect, this equation is the reduced form of 
separate price and total factor productivity equations (see Feenstra and Hanson 1999). Feenstra and Hanson (1999) use 
a variable termed “eﬀ  ective TFP” in their eﬀ  ective price measure. Th   is is calculated as the primal measure of TFP plus the 
average deviation of industry-speciﬁ  c factor price changes from their mean levels. We do not have wage data by production 
and nonproduction worker for the entire period and therefore use only the primal measure of TFP.20
price associated with import unit values on factor cost shares (three factors are used: production workers, 
nonproduction workers, and capital).31 Th   e estimated coeﬃ   cients can be interpreted as the change in the 
return to labor and capital mandated by changes in the price of competing imports. We also estimate the 
changes in factor returns mandated by changes in US tariﬀ   rates imposed on developing and developed 
countries.
Th   e mandated wage approach has been widely used to isolate the eﬀ  ect of developing-country trade 
on US wages (Leamer 1998, Feenstra and Hanson 1999; Haskel and Slaughter 2003). Where our study 
diﬀ  ers from these is that we use direct measures of import competition, namely import unit values, as our 
explanatory variables. Other studies have used quantitative measures of import intensity or technology 
(Feenstra and Hanson 1999) or measures of tariﬀ   and transport costs (Haskel and Slaughter 2003) to 
explain wage inequality.32 To some extent these are indirect measures of international competition. 
Th   e mandated wage regressions corroborate the earlier analysis that ﬁ  nds a minor impact of 
developing-country trade on US wage inequality. Th   e price regressions reveal a small but statistically 
signiﬁ  cant association between US eﬀ  ective prices and international prices and US tariﬀ   rates. However, 
the sector bias of import prices, including those from developing countries as a group, from 1993 to 2006 
mandated no change in US wage levels or wage inequality. 
One explanation for this ﬁ  nding is that price changes within developing countries oﬀ  set each other. 
For example, our estimates indicate that Chinese import prices mandated a rise in the total return to 
labor and a slight increase in wage inequality, but these eﬀ  ects were oﬀ  set by price movements from other 
developing countries. An implication drawn from the results is that developing countries do not have 
equivalent eﬀ  ects on wage inequality in the United States. But overall, the regression analysis suggests that 
trade-induced domestic price changes are not a cause of rising wage inequality in recent years. 
SKILL BIAS OF US IMPORT PRICES 
We are primarily interested in whether import price competition from developing countries has raised 
wage inequality in the United States over the past decade. Ideally we would want to use import price 
31. Th   e second-stage regression is speciﬁ  ed as: 
jt k i k ijt jt k kZ ,
I i
, , ˆ      

where tj is the share of factor i (production 
worker, nonproduction worker, capital) in the average cost of producing one unit of value added of product j. Th  e  coef-
ﬁ  cient ki is interpreted as the change in price of primary factor i that can be attributed to the structural variable Zk. Th  e 
mandated wage analysis is strictly imbedded in the Stolper-Samuelson theoretical framework where factors are mobile 
across sectors such that the zero proﬁ  t condition is maintained in each sector. Our focus is therefore on identifying the 
long-run eﬀ  ect on wages from changes in prices of competing imports.
32. An exception is the study of Haskel and Slaughter (2001) who include import prices for the OECD, Newly 
Industrialized Countries (NICs), and the non-OECD rest of the world in their wage regressions for the United Kingdom. 
Th   eir international price variables are unable to explain any of the rise in UK wage inequality experienced during the 
1980s.21
indices as the measure of import price competition. Unfortunately, the available NAICS-classiﬁ  ed import 
price indices constructed by the Bureau of Labor Standards only cover a short period. We therefore 
construct Tornqvist indices at the four-digit NAICS level for the period 1993–2006 using highly 
disaggregated (10-digit HTS) US import unit values.33 Unit value indices are constructed for a developed-
country group, China, Mexico, an Asian grouping (Malaysia, Singapore, Korea, Th  ailand,  Indonesia, 
Taiwan, and Philippines), and other developing countries. China and Mexico are included separately as 
they both account for a relatively high proportion of US imports (more than 10 percent after 2000).34 
As a consistency check, we ﬁ  rst plot relative price indices for the selected countries and country 
groupings. Figure 4 presents the log ratio of the weighted average import price of production worker–
intensive sectors relative to nonproduction worker–intensive sectors with the index value for 2006 set 
equal to one (i.e., the log of the index equals zero in 2006). Th   e average share of production workers 
and nonproduction worker wage costs in value added for 1997, 2002, and 2007 are used as weights. 
Declining relative price indices would be consistent with rising wage inequality from trade in the United 
States. 
Th   e relative price indices reveal substantial variation in the skill bias of import prices with no 
consistent relationship across developing countries. Import unit values from Mexico and other developing 
countries rose in production worker–intensive sectors relative to nonproduction worker–intensive sectors 
implying pressures for declining wage inequality over the period as a whole.35 In contrast, trends in unit 
values for imports from China and developed countries imply pressures for rising wage inequality, but 
the magnitude of the diﬀ  erence in weighted average prices from 1996–2006 is very small (equivalent to 2 
log points). For developing countries, as a whole, trends in import prices (unit values) in production worker–
intensive sectors appear to be no diﬀ  erent from nonproduction worker–intensive sectors. 
In sum, the sector bias of import prices from developing countries as a whole appears to be too small 
to have eﬀ  ected substantial changes in US wage inequality in recent years. But the trends also reveal that 
33. Th   e data are sourced from the Center for International Data. See Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002) for a discussion 
on the data. Th   e data are ﬁ  rst converted to time-consistent HTS codes using the code provided in Pierce and Schott 
(2009). We then exclude the top and bottom 1 percent of data to remove outliers. Further, new products are included in 
the Tornqvist index, but we do not adjust for the biases that the entry of new products and exit of old products have on 
the index (see Feenstra 1994 and Broda and Weinstein 2006).
34. Developed countries are made up of high-income countries as deﬁ  ned by the World Bank’s Country Classiﬁ  cation. 
One limitation of our measure of import price competition is that unit values are not true price indices in that changes 
in the composition and quality of imports can change the calculated unit value even if product prices are unchanged. A 
second concern is that errors in the measurement of value or quantity of trade data introduce errors into the unit value 
measures. We attempt to overcome some of these limitations by using highly disaggregated trade data, but heterogeneity in 
prices across countries and measurement errors are evident even at this level of disaggregation (see Schott 2004).
35. Th   e volatility of the price ratio for Mexico is a result of volatile price changes in the NAICS sector 3364 (aerospace 
products and parts), which is relatively skill intensive. Few products are imported from this sector leading to large 
movements in price changes.22
the wage eﬀ  ect of import competition in the United States is not necessarily equivalent for all developing 
countries. 
IMPORT COMPETITION AND US EFFECTIVE PRICES
To isolate the impact of these import price changes on US wages we ﬁ  rst need to determine the extent to 
which they alter US prices. If import prices have little impact on the price received by US producers, then 
it is unlikely that they will substantially change US wages, irrespective of their sector bias. 
Table 4 presents the results of various price regressions using four-digit NAICS data over the period 
1993–2006. Th   e dependent variable is calculated as the log change in value-added prices plus total factor 
productivity growth, using data obtained from the BLS multifactor productivity database. Because the 
dependent variable in the price equation includes total factor productivity growth, our estimates, to some 
extent, deal with the argument by Wood (1994) that ﬁ  rms respond to import competition by upgrading 
capital and improving productivity (termed “defensive innovation”).
Th   e independent variables include the log change in import prices, the log change in US import-
weighted average tariﬀ  s imposed on developed and developing countries, and various other controls 
for other factors inﬂ  uencing US prices. Th   ese controls include the ratio of production workers to 
nonproduction workers, the capital-labor ratio, and the share of information capital stock in total capital 
stock (in 2000 prices at two-digit NAICS level). Finally, sector dummy variables are included to capture 
time-invariant sector eﬀ  ects and two-digit NAICS by year interaction dummy variables are used to 
account for sector invariant time eﬀ  ects at the two-digit level. 
Th   e price equation performs well. Th  e  ﬁ  rst column of results presents the coeﬃ   cients of a basic 
regression where US eﬀ  ective prices are regressed on aggregate import unit values, US tariﬀ  s, and the 
various controls. Close to 47 percent of the variation in eﬀ  ective prices is explained by the regression and 
the sign on the import unit values is positive as expected. A 10 percent rise in aggregate import prices 
is associated with a 1.8 percent rise in US eﬀ  ective prices. Tariﬀ   protection also raises eﬀ  ective prices, 
but only if imposed on trade from developing countries. A 1 percent reduction in tariﬀ  s, calculated as 
ln(1+tariﬀ   rate), on developing-country imports is associated with a 0.54 percent decline in US eﬀ  ective 
prices. Our tariﬀ   variable is a measure of protection on output, so this outcome is expected.36 
Our primary interest is the relationship between US prices and developing-country trade. 
Accordingly, column 2 and 3 of table 4 disaggregate US import unit values into developed- and 
developing-country components. Once again, the signs of the coeﬃ   cients are as expected: import prices 
36. Unfortunately, we do not have an indicator of tariﬀ   protection on intermediate inputs. As implied by Grossman 
and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) tariﬀ   liberalization that reduces the cost of intermediate inputs is expected to have a positive 
impact on eﬀ  ective prices.23
from both developed and developing countries are positively correlated with US eﬀ  ective prices (column 
2). Further disaggregation (column 3) reveals signiﬁ  cant coeﬃ   cients for US import unit values from 
China and other developing countries but insigniﬁ  cant coeﬃ   cients for Mexico and the Asian group. 
Th   e size of the coeﬃ   cient on developed countries (0.146) is large compared to China (0.037) and other 
developing countries (0.033), but this is to be expected as the group of high-income countries account 
for between 56 to 75 percent of US manufacturing imports used in our analysis.37 Overall these results 
suggest that US domestic products are closer (but imperfect) substitutes from goods imports from 
developed countries than they are for goods imported from developing countries. A theme we will 
develop more fully in the next chapter.
In the fourth column, we exclude the computer sector (NAICS 334) because of the rapid changes 
in price and productivity experienced within that sector. Th   e results hardly change. Column 5 includes 
additional variables for the interaction of import price changes with a measure of the skill intensity of 
production. Th   ese interaction terms allow for diﬀ  erential impacts of import price changes on eﬀ  ective 
prices across sectors. Some changes in coeﬃ   cients are evident. Th   e positive impact of Chinese prices on 
eﬀ  ective prices is stronger in skill-intensive sectors. Th  e  coeﬃ   cient on Mexican import unit values is now 
positive, but the eﬀ  ect declines as the skill intensity of the sector rises. Th  e  coeﬃ   cients on import unit 
values from high-income countries and other developing countries remain positive and rise slightly. 
Th   ese price equations establish a mechanism through which international competition inﬂ  uences 
the eﬀ  ective return to US producers.38 US eﬀ  ective prices are found to be responsive to changes in the 
border price of imports, whether originating from changes in the foreign selling price of competing goods 
or from changes in US tariﬀ   rates. What remains is to establish whether changes in foreign prices gave rise 
to economically signiﬁ  cant changes in US wages. 
MANDATED WAGES
In the second stage, we estimate changes in wages and the return to capital that can be attributed to 
import prices. Th   e mandated wages are obtained by regressing the predicted changes in US eﬀ  ective 
prices associated with import prices on factor cost shares. Th   e estimation approach therefore requires 
data on remuneration to workers and capital as a share of value added. Unfortunately, we are unable to 
obtain data at the four-digit NAICS level on the share of production and nonproduction workers in 
wage remuneration over the entire 1993–2006 period. We therefore construct average labor cost shares 
37. Th  e  coeﬃ   cient combines the eﬀ  ect of the import share and the elasticity. 
38. Strictly speaking we have identiﬁ  ed the association between US eﬀ  ective prices and international prices. If foreigners 
price to market, then it is possible that the foreign prices are endogenous resulting in various endogeneity biases when 
estimating the relationship. In addition, it is possible that an unobserved third factor may be driving the association. We 
are therefore circumspect about attributing causality to the relationship. 24
(of value added) using US Census data for 1997, 2002, and 2007. Th   e share of capital remuneration in 
value added is calculated as the residual (i.e., 1 – wage bill share of value added). Th   e predicted change in 
eﬀ  ective prices over the entire period 1993–2006 is then regressed on these factor shares. 
Th   e mandated wage regression results are presented in table 5. Th  e  ﬁ  rst two columns present the 
percentage change in wages over the period 1993–2006 mandated by changes in US import prices from 
developed (high-income) countries (column 1) and developing countries (column 2). Th  e  remaining 
columns present the mandated wages based on the disaggregated price equation estimates in column 3 of 
table 4. 
Th   e results reveal a fair amount of variation across countries. Looking at column 1, the sector bias 
of developed-country price changes from 1993–2006 mandated a 4.6 percent rise in the nominal wage 
of nonproduction workers and a 5.7 percent rise in the return to capital to maintain zero proﬁ  ts in all 
sectors. No change in the wage of production workers is mandated. Also presented in the table are the 
mandated changes in the skill and capital premium and their associated signiﬁ  cance levels. Th  e  outcome 
of these results is that import prices from high income countries mandated a 4.75 percentage point rise in 
the skill premium in US manufacturing, although the data suggests that the premium is not signiﬁ  cantly 
diﬀ  erent from zero.
Looking at the results for developing countries, we ﬁ  nd contrasting and oﬀ  setting eﬀ  ects on wages 
for diﬀ  erent regions and countries. In particular, the eﬀ  ect of Chinese imports (column 4) in raising wage 
inequality (by 2.15 percent) is more than oﬀ  set by the inequality reducing impact of imports from other 
developing economies (column 5) (4.27 percent) and the decline in mandated wages of nonproduction 
workers from tariﬀ   liberalization. Similarly, Chinese import prices into the US mandated a statistically 
signiﬁ  cant rise in the return to labor relative to capital, but this was also oﬀ  set by sectoral trends in US 
import prices from other developing economies. 
Taken together therefore US imports from developing countries mandated no change in US wage 
inequality from 1993 to 2006. Th   is outcome is also revealed by the insigniﬁ  cant changes in production 
and nonproduction worker wages mandated by changes in aggregate US import unit values from 
developing countries (column 2).39 
Th   e results raise some interesting challenges to the common bifurcation of the world into 
developed- and developing-country groups. In the period we analyze, 1993–2006, the composition of 
developing-country trade and the sector biases of price changes were not equivalent across countries 
leading to very diﬀ  erent inﬂ  uences on US wages and wage inequality. Th   e heterogeneity of developing-
country trade ﬂ  ows to the US requires a more reﬁ  ned and disaggregated assessment of their impact on US 
wages than has commonly been applied in the past. 
39. Similarly, estimates based on aggregate US import unit values calculated using all countries reveal no signiﬁ  cant change 
in relative wages, but do reveal a signiﬁ  cant rise in the return to capital relative to labor. 25
Our results also present an unexpected impact on US wages from Chinese import competition. Th  e 
sector bias of Chinese import prices mandated a rise in wages of both production and nonproduction workers 
and only a minor and statistically insigniﬁ  cant increase in wage inequality. Th   e surprising result here is the 
ﬁ  nding that Chinese imports have adversely aﬀ  ected capital-intensive sectors in the United States. It could 
be that while many people think of China as a relatively labor-intensive country, it is more appropriate to 
think of its production structure as capital intensive.
CONCLUSIONS
Th   is analysis suggests that the fears of rising US wage inequality from developing-country imports in 
recent years are unwarranted. While conventional trade theory makes such expectations plausible our 
investigation reveals they are far oﬀ   the mark. At the most disaggregated level for which comprehensive 
skills data are available we have found that the US industries competing with developing country imports 
are not particularly intensive in unskilled labor. Moreover, the relative eﬀ  ective prices of the US industries 
that are unskilled labor–intensive have actually increased rather than decreased since the early 1990s. 
Changes in eﬀ  ective US prices from whatever cause have not mandated changes in relative wages. Neither 
have changes that can be ascribed to import prices mandated increases in wage inequality. 
Th   e lack of association at a highly disaggregated level between imports from developing countries 
and skill intensity is consistent with at least three diﬀ  erent explanations: ﬁ  rst, the Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory is wrong and developing countries have not actually specialized in goods that are unskilled labor 
intensive; second, there are factor-intensity reversals and the goods imported from developing countries 
are produced using unskilled labor–intensive methods in developing countries but using skill-intensive 
methods in the US; or third, developed and developing countries are basically producing diﬀ  erent goods. 
Using 10-digit unit-value data we have found that the evidence supports the last interpretation (Edwards 
and Lawrence 2010 forthcoming, chapter 8). Th   e goods exported by developing countries are highly 
imperfect substitutes for those produced by developed countries. Th   is means that for the most part, 
unskilled US workers are not competing head to head with their counterparts in developing countries. 
It also suggests that methodological approaches to the question of trade and wages that measure the 
net factor content of trade or that assume that imports and domestic products and/or tasks are close 
substitutes rest on extremely shaky grounds.
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Table 1     Weighted relative eff  ective prices, four-digit NAICS industries (log scale 2006 = 0)
1987 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006
Developing/developed import weights
(1) Defl  ators 0.45 0.41 0.28 0.12 0.02 0
(2) Multifactor productivity (inverse) 0.39 0.36 0.24 0.09 0.02 0
(3) Eff  ective prices (1) – (2) 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.02 0 0
Production/nonproduction employment weights
(4) Defl  ators –0.13 –0.12 –0.09 –0.04 –0.01 0
(5) Multifactor productivity (inverse) –0.11 –0.10 –0.07 –0.04 –0.01 0
(6) Eff  ective prices (4) – (5) –0.02 –0.02 –0.02 –0.01 0 0
LDC = Average share of industry in US manufactured imports from developing countries 1997 to 2006.
DC = Average share of industry in US manufactured imports from developing countries 1997 to 2006.
Production = Average share of industry in US manufacturing employment of production workers (1997, 2002, and 2007).
Nonproduction = Average share of industry in US manufacturing employment of nonproduction workers (1997, 2002, and 2007).
Source: BLS Multifactor Productivity Data, ITC Data Web.





Ratio developing / 
developed Manufacturing
Total 0.55 0.60 0.91 0.71
Non-computers 0.63 0.64 0.99 0.73
NAICS 334 0.50 0.48 1.03 0.48
Developing-country weights = Share of industry in US manufactured imports from developing countries 1997 to 2007.
Developed-country weights = Share of industry in US manufactured imports from developed countries 1997 to 2007.
Non-computers = excluding NAICS industries 3341 through 3345.
NAICS 334 = computers and electronics.
Source: US Census of Manufactures. 
Table 3     Weighted relative eff  ective prices without computers, four-digit NAICS industries 
  excluding NAICS 334 (log scale 2006 = 0)
1987 1990 1995 2000 2006
Defl  ators
Developing/developed 0.04 0.03 0 0.01 0
Production/nonproduction 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0
Eff  ective prices
Developing/developed 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0
Production/nonproduction 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0
Developing = Average share of industry in US manufactured imports from developing countries 1997 to 2006.
Developed = Average share of industry in US manufactured imports from developing countries 1997 to 2006.
Production = Average share of industry in US manufacturing employment of production workers (1997, 2002, and 2007).
Non-production = Average share of industry in US manufacturing employment of nonproduction workers (1997, 2002, and 2007).
Note: The following four-digit NAICS industries are excluded: NAICS 3341, 3342, 3343, 3344, 3345, and 3346.
Source: BLS Multifactor Productivity Data and ITC Data Web.30
Table 4     First stage determinants of US eff  ective prices in manufacturing








































ln(P Developed) x skill/unskill –0.029
(0.078)
ln(P China) x skill/unskill 0.081
(0.046)
ln(P Mexico) x skill/unskill –0.042
(0.018)
ln(P Asia) x skill/unskill 0.043
(0.440)
ln(P Other) x skill/unskill –0.025
(0.021)


















































N 1128 1123 1089 1005 1089
F 4.79 4.6 5.05 5.13 5.15
r2 0.455 0.438 0.49 0.494 0.499
Notes: The dependent variable is the log change in value-added prices plus log change in total factor productivity. All estimation is over four-digit NAICS 
industries covering the period 1993–2006. Equations are weighted by the average industry share of the wage bill for each year. Bold variables are signifi  cant 
at 10 percent level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses beneath the coeffi   cients. Variable descriptions and sources are as follows: K/L: Productive 
Capital Stock (Direct Aggregate-Billions of 2000 Dollars) per employee, three-digit NAICS. Source: BLS. Skill/unskill: Non-production workers/production 
workers, NAICS four-digit. Source: BLS. ln(tariff  ): Log change in 1 plus import weighted average tariff   rate (1+tariff  ), NAICS 4-digit: Source: own calculations 
using trade data from Feenstra et al. (2002). Information K/total K: Information Capital stock/Total capital stock, NAICS 3-digit. Source: BLS31
Table 5     Mandated wages, 1993–2006
Based on column 2 results 
of table 4
















ln(Tariff   
developing)
(6)
Production worker –0.20% –0.30% –0.30% 2.60% 1.00% 0.80%
(0.021) (0.011) (0.03) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010)
Nonproduction worker 4.6% 2.4% 6.4% 4.8% –3.3% –3.1%
(0.023) (0.018) (0.033) (0.023) (0.011) (0.017)
Capital 5.7% 1.5% 8.0% –3.1% 3.5% –1.00%
(0.017) (0.009) (0.024) (0.013) (0.01) (0.006)
N 8 5 8 5 8 58 58 58 5
F 36.99 13.07 37.03 10.07 11.2 14.84
r2 0.641 0.339 0.641 0.351 0.375 0.495
Mandated change in 
relative factor returns
Wage nonproduction/
    wage production
4.75 2.67 6.67 2.15 –4.27** –3.87
Rental capital/wage 
    production worker
5.87* 1.73 8.23* –5.71*** 2.49 –1.76
Rental capital/wage 
    nonproduction worker




Notes: Equations are weighted by the average industry share of the wage bill for each year. Bold variables are signifi  cant at 10 percent level. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses beneath the coeffi   cients. The description and source of the data are as follows: Capital cost share: Share of capital payments in 
value added. Capital share calculated as 1 – Lshare where Lshare is share labor remuneration in value added. Production worker cost share: Share of produc-
tion worker payments in value added used as proxy for unskilled labor intensity of production. Calculated as: sprod*Lsharet where sprod is average share 
production workers remuneration in total wage bill based on 1997, 2002, and 2007 data obtained from Census Bureau. Nonproduction worker cost share is 
calculated as (1-sprod)*Lsharet.
Source: BLS data as used to calculate multifactor productivity.32








Figure 1     Ratio of developing to industrial country US manufactured import prices 
  (log scale 2008 = 0)
log scale
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics Import Price Indices.
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Figure 2     Trade- and skill-weighted relative eff  ective prices (log scale 2006 = 0)
log scale













  Developing/developed, import weighted









  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
  Developing/developed, import weighted PPI
  Production/nonproduction, skill weighted PPI
 Figure 3     Import- and skill-weighted six-digit NAICS producer prices





















Figure 4     Production worker–weighted import unit values relative to non production 
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Source: Authors’ calculations.